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Abstract
This paper examines diversication as a source of value creation
and destruction in private equity. The literature has focused on the
`diversication discount' in corporations. It has not analyzed diver-
sication in PE-funds, where diversication might increase value by
ameliorating managerial risk aversion and by facilitating knowledge
sharing. Thus, I examine a sample of 1505 PE-funds to show that
industry and geographic diversication increases PE-fund returns on
average, this is likely due to knowledge-sharing/learning, and is not
due to mere risk-reduction or endogeneity. Diversication can also de-
stroy value if it spreads sta too thinly across industries/regions or is
motivated by risk-aversion over performance bonuses.
Keywords: Diversication; Private Equity; Venture Capital
11 Introduction
Diversication can destroy value in some, but not all, corporations. Diver-
sication can increase rm-size and entrench managers. This can facilitate
shirking and empire-building (Amihud and Lev, 1999; Aron, 1988). Em-
pirical evidence supports this prediction. However, diversication might in-
crease value in some companies by reducing agency conicts of managerial
risk aversion and by facilitating knowledge-transfers between divisions. This
should particularly benet PE-funds since they invest in high risk companies
and generate value by sharing knowledge and expertise. Prior literature has
not examined the value-implications of diversication in PE-funds.
The main contributions of this paper are to examine diversication in
PE funds and to show: (1) diversication increases PE funds' returns; and,
(2) this may be because diversication facilitates learning and knowledge
transfers. (3) Risk-reduction may increase PE-funds' returns, but this does
not drive the relation between diversication and returns. (4) Endogeneity
does not drive the return/diversication relation. (5) Diversication re-
duces returns if it spreads sta too thinly across industries or regions. (6)
Diversication appears to reduce value if the motivation is risk-aversion over
obtaining a performance bonus. (7) Returns decrease with the number of in-
vestment rounds in which the fund participates. This partially supports the
theory in Guler (2007) that institutional pressures can induce sub-optimal
investments in later investment-states.
Prior empirical literature has focused on `corporations', rather than `PE
funds', and has found that diversication reduces rm value. Denis, Denis,
and Yost (2002) show that industrial and geographic diversication reduce
2rm-value. Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and Chaterjee and Aw (2004) show
that the market reacts negatively to cross-border acquisitions. Moeller and
Schlingemann (2005) nd that the market reacts signicantly negatively to
takeovers that diversify across region or industry and that this reects a
lower post-takeover operating performance.1 Chakrabarti, Singh, and Mah-
mood (2007) show that the negative relation between diversication and
performance is robust to country and the level of economic development.
Analogously, the literature suggests that rms can generate value by re-
focusing and divesting non-core assets (see Berger and Ofek, 1999; Haynes,
Thompson, and Wright, 2002; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002). However, there
are several reasons to believe that this result might not hold for PE funds.
Diversication might benet PE-funds. PE funds are both investment
vehicles and corporations. They are investment vehicles in that they invest
in portfolio of companies. They are corporations in that PE-fund managers
actively engage in the corporate management and strategy of the portfolio
company. Diversication might benet both aspects of a PE-fund.
From a portfolio management perspective, PE-funds invest in risky assets
with a high failure rate (Dimov and De Clercq, 2006). This might induce
agency conicts of managerial risk aversion. Diversication can `average-
out' this risk; and thus, might ameliorate these agency conicts.
From a corporate perspective, syndication and connections between PE-
funds can create value (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007). Diversication
might amplify these connections. This diversication might also facilitate
knowledge-transfers between portfolio-companies, and might expose man-
1This event-study approach largely addresses the endogeneity concerns raised in Campa
and Kedia (2002).
3agers to a wide-range of skills (Lin and Lee, 2009). Further, given that
the regulatory environment can inuence PE-fund returns (Cumming and
Walz, 2010), international diversication might facilitate regulatory arbi-
trage. Seed or start-up companies should especially benet from this due to
their reliance on PE-funds for managerial and technological expertise.
There is limited empirical evidence on the impact of diversication in
the PE sector. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) examine diversication
in 73 funds between 1981 and 1993. The data-set comprises the funds in
which their source (one limited partner) considered investing. They nd no
signicant relation between IRRs and the number of industries in the fund's
portfolio or the number or the percentage invested in the dominant industry.
Nonetheless, this might reect self-selection on the part of the data source
(the investor) to focus upon PE funds in which it might want to invest.
Lossen (2006) examines 100 European funds and nds some weak evidence
that diversication across industries increases returns. However, the sample
is limited to 100 PE-funds in Europe and the sign and signicance of the
result varies across model specication. Knill (2009) nds a positive relation
between diversication and `growth' (dened as the change in the fund's
capital under management). But this denition of `growth' is not the same
as returns for it may merely reect the ability to raise capital rather than
to convert capital into value. Humphery-Jenner (2011b) shows a positive
relation between diversication and returns, but does not test the driver of
this relation.
The limited empirical evidence suggests that further examination of di-
versication in the PE industry is warranted. I use a sample of 1505 PE-
funds from 1980 to 2007 raised in the US. I examine whether and why in-
4dustry/geographic diversication inuences returns. I focus on whether any
positive diversication/returns relation is due to knowledge-sharing/learning
between portfolio companies, or merely reects endogeneity or risk-reduction.
I also examine whether diversication destroys value by spreading sta to
thinly and limiting the attention they can pay to individual regions/industries,
or by facilitating managerial risk-aversion with respect to performance bonuses.
The results show that diversication may increase returns by facilitating
knowledge-sharing between portfolio companies. The results show that di-
versication increases returns on average. It especially does so seed-funds,
which might particularly benet from knowledge-sharing and learning be-
tween diverse portfolio companies. Further, diversication in funds previ-
ously raised by the current fund's management rm increases returns, im-
plying that prior diversication may create skills that the present fund can
use to increase returns. Mere risk-reduction and endogeneity do not drive
the results. Overall, this suggests that learning and knowledge sharing may
explain why diversication increases returns in PE funds.
I nd that risk-reduction may increase returns; however, does not ex-
plain the relation between industry/geographic diversication and returns.
Increasing the number of portfolio companies in a fund reduces the fund's
exposure to idiosyncratic (or company-specic) risk. I nd that returns in-
crease with the number of portfolio companies. An explanation is that some
reduction in risk reduces managerial risk aversion and encourages managers
to invest in companies that are more risky. Nonetheless, industry and geo-
graphic diversication still increase returns after controlling for this eect.
Diversication can reduce value in some cases. Diversication reduces
5value if it reduces the sta-to-region or sta-to-industry ratio, suggesting
that diversication destroys value if spreads sta too thin. Diversication
also appears to destroy value if the motivation is managerial risk aversion
of performance bonuses.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details the prior literature
and hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample, variables and methodology.
Section 4 contains the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
This section outlines the hypotheses. The overarching idea is to test (1)
whether diversication inuences IRRs, and (2) if so, why it inuences IRRs.
Thus, I test seven main hypotheses and an eighth mosaic hypothesis. The
eighth hypothesis ties together the preceding seven hypotheses to posit when
learning might explain the relation between diversication and returns.
2.1 Diversication and learning: On seed funds and diversi-
cation in prior funds
Diversication might increase value for PE-funds in general, and seed-focused
PE-funds in especial. A key explanation relates to knowledge-sharing and
learning.
62.1.1 Diversication in general and in seed funds
Diversication might improve the PE-manager's skill-set and industry con-
nections. PE managers add value by providing managerial, nancial, and
technical expertise (Ivanov and Xie, 2010; McDougall, Robinson, and DeNisi,
1992). Some technical skills are industry specic. However, in an innovation-
intensive environment, managers can expand their knowledge-base by engag-
ing in diverse, but tangentially related, elds (Hurry, Miller, and Bowman,
1992; Lin and Lee, 2009; Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan, 1988). Additionally,
Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) highlight the nancial importance of
wide-ranging industry networks to PE funds. These networks rely on inter-
actions between industries. Further, for seed-funds, which are dicult to
value; and thus, dicult to nance. Connections should help the fund raise
capital.
Diversication might enable the PE-fund to facilitate knowledge spill-
overs. Knowledge transfers from PE-managers to portfolio companies, and
from portfolio companies to other portfolio companies are a key way to
create value (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007). In corporations, this is
especially true for diversication across similar knowledge-based industries
(following Hansen, 2002; Miller, 2006; Schilling and Phelps, 2007; Tanriverdi
and Venkatraman, 2005; Teece, 1980, 1982). Further, knowledge transfers
are important to innovation generation (Ahuja, 2000; Tsai, 2001). Seed
investments especially benet from this since they rely on knowledge sharing
and managerial expertise to generate value.
This theoretical basis induces prediction that diversication increase PE-
fund returns, especially if the fund invests in start-ups. Hypothesis 1 and
7Hypothesis 2 summarize these predictions.
Hypothesis 1 PE-fund returns increase with the number of industry-segments
and geographic regions in which the fund invests.
Hypothesis 2 PE-funds who make `seed' of `start-up' investments benet
more from diversication than do other PE-funds.
2.1.2 Returns and prior-fund diversication
The learning hypothesis also implies that if (a) a fund's management rm has
raised prior funds, and (b) there is some communication or personnel overlap
between the funds, and (c) diversication induces learning and knowledge-
sharing, then the level of diversication in the previous fund should increase
IRRs in the present fund. In short, diversication in prior funds raised by
the same management rm should increase returns in the present fund. I
focus on the level of diversication in the last fund raised before the present
fund. Hypothesis 3 summarizes this.
Hypothesis 3 The level of diversication in the fund that (a) was raised by
the present fund's management rm, and (b) was raised before the present
fund, should increase returns in the present fund.
2.2 Diversication and risk reduction
Risk reduction may explain any relation between diversication and returns.
This is for two key reasons.
8First, diversication might create value by ameliorating agency conicts
of managerial risk aversion. One source of agency conict is excess manage-
rial risk aversion. Managers invest more personal capital in their companies
than do shareholders. Thus, managers have greater rm (or fund) specic
risk exposure. Thus, managers might prefer investments that are safer than
is optimal for shareholders. This is especially problematic in PE funds be-
cause (1) most of the manager's income comes from a performance bonus
(called `carry') (Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009), and (2) PE funds are risky
and have highly skewed returns (Chiampou and Kallett, 1989; Cochrane,
2005; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Humphery-Jenner, 2011a; Korteweg and
Sorensen, 2010). One way to solve this is to reduce the fund's overall level
of risk. Portfolio theory suggests that diversication can reduce the fund's
exposure industry-specic and region-specic risks. This might encourage
managers to invest in riskier companies and might align managers' incentives
with those of shareholders.
Second, diversication might reduce the fund's exposure to industry/region
specic risk; and thus, increase returns. This rests on two premises. (1) Di-
versication across industry, region, or both is likely to reduce the fund's ex-
posure to rm/investment-specic risk. (2) Reducing risk might ameliorate
the skewness in VCPE investments, which drives-down returns (Humphery-
Jenner, 2011a). Thus, a possibility is that mere risk reduction drives any
diversication/return relationship. If risk-reduction drives the results, then
diversication (a) should not inuence returns after controlling for the fund's
portfolio size (on grounds that the portfolio size represents the ability to re-
duce risk), and (b) should not inuence risk-adjusted IRRs. This induces
Hypothesis 4.
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riskiness. Thus, diversication should not inuence risk-adjusted IRRs and
should not inuence IRRs after controlling for the fund's portfolio size (which
is a proxy for the fund's reduction in investment-specic/idiosyncratic risk).
Further, returns should increase with the number of portfolio companies in
which the fund invests.
2.3 Diversication and limited attention
The limited attention hypothesis argues that diversication reduces returns
if it spreads sta too thin. This is especially important in the VCPE sec-
tor, where funds typically feature relatively few sta (Metrick and Yasuda,
2010). Cumming and Dai (2011) suggest that larger PE funds might earn
lower returns because the ratio of investments-to-sta increases. Thus, the
VCPE-sta devote less time to each investment. Similar reasoning suggests
that increasing diversication forces managers to monitor multiple indus-
tries/regions. Thus, if the ratio of industries/regions-to-sta increases, then
sta devote less time to each region/industry. This might reduce returns.
This induces Hypothesis 5.
Hypothesis 5 PE-fund returns decrease with the industries (or geogra-
phies) to PE professionals.
2.4 Fees and diversication
The fee structure might inuence the fund's returns. PE funds obtain fund-
ing from investors (limited partners). The investors contract with the fund
10to invest the money. The management contract stipulates the nature of the
PE fund's compensation. The compensation typically comprises both (a)
a management fee charged on capital under management, and (b) a per-
formance bonus (carry) that is generally payable only if the fund's return
exceeds a specic level (Kandel, Leshchinskii, and Yuklea, 2011; Metrick and
Yasuda, 2010).
The structure of the fees might inuence the reason the fund diversi-
es and this might inuence returns. A key problem is that the carry is
payable only if the fund's overall return exceeds the threshold. This might
induce risk-aversion with respect to exceeding the threshold (Humphery-
Jenner, 2011c). This risk aversion might induce PE managers to diversify
the fund simply to reduce the risk of failing to reach the performance-bonus-
threshold. Such risk-reduction-diversication might reduce value (following
Amihud and Lev, 1999; Aron, 1988). Thus, I predict that the returns-to-
diversication decrease with the ratio of carry-to-management fee. Hypoth-
esis 6 summarizes this.
Hypothesis 6 The returns-to-diversication decrease with the ratio of carry-
to-management fee. That is, returns are negatively related to the interaction
of (a) Carry fees/Management fees and (b) diversication.
2.5 Joint industry and geography diversication
The interaction of industry and geographic diversication might inuence
PE-funds' returns. Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim (1997) nd that corporate re-
turns increase (and then decrease) if rms jointly increase geographic and
11industrial diversication. This is largely based upon (a) the creation of
economies of scale and scope (Kogut, 1984), (b) the transfer of core busi-
ness capabilities between industry and geographic units (see Hamel, 1991),
and (c) taking advantages of market discrepancies, such as wage dierences
(Kogut, 1985).
PE-funds may similarly gain from joint-diversication; however, excess
joint-diversication might reduce returns. This is for two key reasons. First,
Jones and Hill (1988) and Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland (1994) suggest that
increasing diversication can increase transaction costs. For PE-funds, these
involve fund-raising costs and marketing costs, including management and
logistics costs. Second, the joint-diversication, and subsequent reduction
in any specialized regional or industrial knowledge, will likely increase the
information-processing costs acknowledged in Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland
(1994); Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim (1997); Jones and Hill (1988). This is espe-
cially important for PE-funds due to the importance of knowledge sharing.
This induces Hypothesis 7.
Hypothesis 7 Diversication across both industry and geographic region
initially increases returns, but signicant joint-diversication reduces re-
turns.
2.6 Endogeneity and self-selection
The diversication literature has documented self-selection and endogeneity
issues (for example Campa and Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). Prior studies
focus on whether the the negative relation between rm value and diversi-
12cation (the `diversication discount') is due to endogeneity. The situation in
VCPE is dierent. Here, I hypothesize a positive relation between diversi-
cation and IRRs. Thus, the potential endogeneity is that high quality funds
both (a) are more capable of managing the complexities of diversication, so
are more likely to diversify, and (b) earn higher returns due to their latent
skill and quality. This implies Hypothesis 8.
Hypothesis 8 Endogeneity drives the diversication/return relation.
2.7 Mosaic learning/knowledge-sharing hypothesis
The mosaic hypothesis joins some of the sub-hypotheses to examine whether
any diversication-benet reects learning and knowledge sharing. A hy-
pothesized reason for diversication to create value is that it may facilitate
knowledge sharing and learning. Indirect support for this hypothesis arises if
(a) the funds that are most likely to benet from knowledge sharing/learning
benet from diversication, and (b) there is not another obvious reason for
this diversication benet, and (c) diversication in prior funds increases
returns in the present fund.
A mosaic approach facilitates an indirect test of the learning/knowledge-
sharing hypotheses. As suggested above, seed funds could benet from
knowledge-sharing/ learning, but may also benet from risk reduction. This
implies that there is some support for the learning/knowledge-sharing hy-
pothesis if: (a) diversication creates value on average, (b) diversication
especially benets seed-funds, (c) this does not merely reect risk-reduction,
(d) it is not due to endogeneity/self-selection issues, and (e) diversication
13in the prior fund raised by the fund's management rm increases returns in
the present fund. This induces Hypothesis 9.
Hypothesis 9 Knowledge-sharing/learning can (at least partially) explain
any positive relation between returns and diversication.
3 Methods
This section contains the methodology. First, I detail the sample. Second,
I discuss the variables. Third, I combine these together to provide a fully
detailed empirical strategy. Table 1 summarizes the empirical predictions
and empirical testing strategy.
3.1 Sample
The sample derives from a Preqin, Thomson VentureXpert, and Execucomp.
The sample contains 1505 funds that raised capital between 1980 and 2007.2
Each observation represents a separate fund. There is only one observation
per fund. The data is not panel data. Some private equity corporations
manage several funds.3 Each fund is a discrete corporate entity with a
seperate legal identity.
These datasets provide data on (a) returns, (b) diversication, and (c)
control variables that might inuence returns. The sample excludes funds
2The study excludes observations from before 1980 due to the argued unreliability of
Thomson VentureXpert before 1980. The results hold in a larger sample that includes
funds raised before 1980.
3For example, Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe have nine separate funds in the
sample.
14that lack return, diversication, or control-variable data. The study does
not directly distinguish between `venture' and `private equity' funds. This
is because there is no `bright-line' distinction between the types of funds.
Instead it uses control variables to examine the characteristics of these funds.
The variables are in three categories: (1) dependent (return) variables,
(2) diversication variables, and (3) control variables that might inuence
returns; and thus, might explain any relationship between returns and di-
versication.
3.2 Dependent variable: IRRs and Risk-adjusted IRRs
The dependent variables measure the fund's performance. First, I focus on
the fund's IRR.4 I note the following.
These returns are net returns. I focus on net returns (gross returns less
fees) because (1) Preqin provides net returns but not gross returns or the
specic timing of cash ows; and thus, and inferring gross returns involves
making potentially inaccurate assumptions about the fund's life and cash
ows, and (2) net returns are more relevant because they are the returns
that the investor receives from the fund.
The returns represent the returns for the latest year that the fund ex-
isted. Thus, if the fund is liquidated, then the IRR is based on all realized
cash ows to date less the fees and carry. However, if the fund has not been
liquidated, then the IRR is based on all realized cash ows and the esti-
4The results are robust to using another measure of the fund's return, its exit multiple
(the nal value of the fund divided by the amount of capital raised). I suppress these
results for brevity.
15mated value of unrealized assets. The estimated value is based on Preqin's
internal estimates, and data that Preqin obtains from the investors (LPs)
and/or the fund.
Second, I analyze the fund's risk-adjusted IRR in order to test Hypoth-
esis 4, which predicts that diversication has no (or less) impact on risk-
adjusted IRRs. I do this by subtracting the average return for all funds
earned of the given fund's type and vintage. This benchmark return max-
imally reduces idiosyncratic risk; and thus, provides a way to test whether
diversication inuences risk-adjusted returns.
3.3 Hypothesized variables: Industry and Geographic diver-
sication
The diversication variables are `Num Inds' and `Num Geos', which are
respectively the number of industry-sectors5 and number of geographic-
regions6 in which the fund invests.7 The data is from Preqin.
I also examine diversication in prior funds raised by the given fund's
5Preqin indicates if the fund invests in companies in the following 48 elds: Business
services, communications, computer services, consumer products, consumer services, me-
dia, education, engineering, environmental services, nancial services, gaming, healthcare,
security, manufacturing, clean technology, energy (general), energy (renewable), food,
hardware, software, retail, utilities, biotechnology, medical devices, medical instruments,
medical technology, entertainment, chemicals, aerospace, insurance, internet focused, mar-
keting, leisure, environmental services.
6A geographic region is a `country' (such as Australia) with two key exceptions: (1)
north, east, south, west and central US count as separate regions, and (2) countries in the
pacic rim count as one region.
7The results in Figure 1 show a linear relationship between IRRs and both industry-
diversication and geographic-diversication. This suggests against including non-linear
industry-diversication or geographic-diversication terms. While some studies show a
curvilinear relationship between diversication and performance, (see Hoskisson, Hitt, and
Hill, 1991; Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 2000; Qian, Khoury, Peng, and Qian, 2010), these
studies focus on pure corporate diversication as opposed to diversication in PE-funds.
16management rm. A management rm can raise many funds. There may
be some stang over-lap between funds. Thus, if there is some overlap in
personnel between funds and diversication does facilitate learning, then
diversication in the prior fund should increase returns in the present fund.
Thus, I examine models that replace `Num Inds' and `Num Geos' with the
number of industries and/or regions invested in by the fund that (a) was
raised immediately prior to the present fund, and (b) was raised by the
present fund's management rm. These models drop observations for which
there was no `prior fund'. This reduces the sample size to 753 observations.
3.4 Hypothesized intermediating and moderator variables
Seed Fund: The variable `Seed Fund' is an indicator that equals one if
the fund invests in seed or start-up companies and prefers to invest in seed
investments. A `Seed Fund' can invest in non-seed investments; however,
a `Non Seed Fund' does not invest in seed investments.8 Prior literature
shows that start-up investments have a high failure rate (see for example
Dimov and De Clercq, 2006; Roure and Maidique, 1986; Zacharakis and
Meyer, 2000). Thus, the prediction is that smaller investments experience
lower returns, on average. The investment size data is from VentureXpert
the seed-investment data is from Preqin.
Number of people: The variable `Num People' is the number of invest-
ment professionals in the fund. I obtain this from Preqin's Fund Managers
database. The professionals are people who manage investments (and do
8Preqin only reports whether the fund makes seed investments. It does not report the
dollar-value of the investments deemed to be seed investments. Thus, `Seed' is a dummy
variable rather than a continuous variable.
17not include general and administrative sta). I use this to test Hypothesis
5 by analyzing the interaction terms `Num Geos / Num People' and `Num
Inds / Num People'.
Carry/Flat: The variable `Carry/Flat' is the ratio of the performance
fees to the at management fees. The `carry' is the performance fee that is
payable if the fund meets a certain benchmark return.9 The management
fee is typically around 1.5% to 2.5% of the funds under management. The
goal is to test Hypothesis 6 by examining whether the interaction between
industry/geographic diversication and `Carry/Flat' reduces returns. I note
that (1) there is no publicly available data on the fees charged by investors
(LPs) to individual funds, but (2) there is little variation in fees when the
funds are sorted into size-groups10 and fund-types (Kandel, Leshchinskii,
and Yuklea, 2011; Metrick and Yasuda, 2010). Thus, I use use the average
carry and average at-fee for fund's of the given fund's type and size (as
suggested in Humphery-Jenner, 2011b).
Number of portfolio companies: The regressions control for the
number of portfolio companies (`Num Port Cos'). I predict that increasing
the number of portfolio companies should increase returns because it is likely
to reduce the fund's exposure to idiosyncratic risk; and thus, should increase
the the fund's risk-adjusted return. This addresses the possibility that risk
reduction drives the relation between returns and industry/geographic di-
versication.
9Interviews with VCPE professionals, and data from Preqin, indicates that a typical
bench mark is 8%.
10The fund size-groups are 0-50m, 50-100m, 100-250m, 250m-500m, 500m-1000m,
1000m-2000m, 2000m or greater. They are based on capital under management
183.5 Control variables
The control variables are factors that might inuence the fund's returns; and
thus, might explain the relationship between diversication and returns.
Fund size: Large funds might earn lower returns. The models control
for the natural log of the fund's capitalization (denoted, `ln(Fund Size)').
This captures the possibility that large size might entrench the fund-managers;
and thus, might reduce fund-returns (consistent with Humphery-Jenner,
2011b; Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011; Moeller, Schlingemann, and
Stulz, 2004, 2005). The fund size data is from VentureXpert.
Average investment size: Investments in smaller companies might
earn lower returns. The variable `ln(Investment Size)' is the natural log
of the average size of the fund's investments. This data is from Thomson
VentureXpert.
Number of rounds: I control for the number of investment rounds
(stages) in which the fund participates (`Num Rounds'). This addresses the
nding in Guler (2007) that institutional pressures might cause funds to
make sub-optimal investments in subsequent investment stages. This data
is from Thomson VentureXpert.
Claimed expertise: Funds that claim high levels of expertise should
earn higher returns. VC and PE funds claim to generate value by con-
tributing knowledge and skills to their portfolio companies (Ivanov and Xie,
2010). Preqin reports whether the fund manager claims to have expertise in
(a) particular industries, (b) technology, (c) management, (d) operations, (e)
marketing, (f) human resources (g) recruiting, (h) networking, or (i) strat-
19egy. The models include the variable `Expertise' that represents the number
of elds in which the fund claims expertise. This data is self-reported as part
of Preqin's data collection process. 11 Thus, `expertise' is bound between
zero and seven. The expertise data is from Preqin.
Connections: Industry and nancial connections should increase re-
turns. PE-funds can create value by facilitating knowledge-transfers (Pow-
ell, Koput, Bowie, and Smith-Doerr, 2002; Weber and Weber, 2007) or by
obtaining better nancing terms. Connections can facilitate better nanc-
ing terms, and knowledge sharing (following Demiroglu and James, 2010;
Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007). A fund is more connected if its em-
ployees serve (or have served) in other PE-funds and/or on the board of
publicly listed companies. Thus, for a given fund, the variable `Connec-
tions' is the number of board-positions, or other PE-fund-roles, that its
employees have had. The board-of-directors data is from Execucomp and
the PE-fund-position data is from Preqin.
Reliance on own funding: A fund might experience lower returns if
it must rely on its own funds to nance its investments. PE-funds usually
obtain capital from limited partners (`LPs'). Thus, if a fund uses its own
capital to fund its investments then it could signal either (a) that the fund is
especially condent about its investments and wants to maintain a greater
share of the prots; or, (b) the fund cannot raise enough capital from LPs.
The former suggests a positive correlation between self-investment and re-
turns; the later suggests a negative correlation. To capture the dominant
11I note that these gures are self-reported; and thus, are subject to some bias. However,
such self-reported variables have seen use in similar corporate applications (see for example
Campello, Graham, and Harvey, 2008; Lins, Servaes, and Rufano, 2010; Onega, T umer-
Alkan, and Vermeer, 2011).
20eect, the models include `Self Invests', an indicator that equals one if Preqin
states that the fund has relied on its own capital.
Share ownership and board representation: PE-funds might im-
prove returns by obtaining management control of their portfolio compa-
nies. Information asymmetry exists between PE-funds and the companies
in which they invest (Trester, 1998). The PE-fund can ameliorate this by
obtaining control rights in the portfolio company (following Bergl of, 1994;
Chan, Siegel, and Thakor, 1990). Two sources of control rights are (1) a
controlling shareholding and (2) representation on the board of directors.
Thus, the indicator `Prefers Controlling' equals one if the PE-fund requires
a controlling shareholding, and the indicator `Rep Required' equals one if
the fund requires a position on the board of directors of its investee compa-
nies. Preqin provides the data on the fund's requirement (or lack thereof)
for board representation and shareholdings.12
Average management and carry fees: Management fees are an ex-
pense that should reduce PE-fund returns. High fees might also induce
high free cash ows within the fund, which might create Jensen (1986)
type agency conicts. Data on the fees that individual PE-funds charge
is not publicly available. However, Preqin reports anonymous PE-fee data
matched by year, which it sources directly from the funds' Private Place-
ment Memorandums. Thus, the models control for the average management
fee and average performance fee (carry) of the fund's type and size group.
The anonymous fee data is from Preqin's fund terms database.
12The variables `Prefer Control Shares' and `Rep Required' are signicantly positively
correlated; however, the key results are qualitatively unchanged in models that omit either
or both of these variables.
21Syndication: Syndication should increase returns. The rationale is
that syndicates can share expertise and exploit each-other's competitive ad-
vantages (Bygrave, 1987). For example, a syndicate might include members
who are dierently skilled at nancing, technical-aspects, and trade-sales.
Thus, a failure to syndicate might reduce returns. Thus, the models in-
clude an indicator (`Solo Investor') that equals one if Preqin reports that
the PE-fund prefers to not invest in a syndicate.
VCPE conditions and Market returns: I control for the environ-
ment in which the fund raises capital. The rationale is that a strong general-
market-performance might induce investors to invest substantial capital in
the PE-fund industry. This over-investment might destroy value by (a) in-
ducing large cash-holdings and causing Harford (1999) type agency conicts;
(b) creating a situation where funds have more capital than they have prof-
itable investments; and thus, invest in companies with diminishing returns-
to-investment (Diller and Kaserer, 2009; Gompers and Lerner, 2000); and
(c) inspiring over-crowding in the PE-industry, which might reduce returns
(following Zhang, 2007). Thus, I control for (1) an indicator that equals one
if the return on the CRSP equally weighted index in the fund's vintage-year
exceeds that in the prior year (`Strong Equity Market'); and (2) the number
of fund's of the given fund's type13 that exist in the fund's vintage year
scaled by the total number of VCPE funds in that vintage year (`VCPE
Sector Activity').
13The `types' are: balanced, buyout, co-investment, subsidiary, distressed, early stage,
seed, start-up, expansion, fund-of-funds, infrastructure, late stage, mezzanine, resources,
real estate, secondaries, `special situation', venture, and venture-debt.
223.6 Method of analysis
The goal is to test the hypotheses. I use multivariate regressions. The
regression specication is in Equation (1). I examine both industry and
geographic diversication. I also examine models that replace `Num Inds'
and `Num Geos' with the level of diversication in the fund that was raised
by the present fund's management rm and was raised immediately prior to
the present fund.
The modeling technique is as follows: The main models models use OLS,
include vintage dummies, and cluster standard errors by both vintage and
by the fund's family or overarching management rm. I analyze Hypothesis
4 both by controlling for the number of companies in the fund's portfolio
and by replacing the IRR with the risk adjusted IRR (`Adj IRR'). I analyze
Hypothesis 8 by using GMM models. The GMM models instrument the vari-
ables `Num Inds' and `Num Geos'. Due to the lack of quality instruments I
run separate regressions for each of industry and geographic diversication.
The four instruments are (a) the number of funds that the management
rm had previously raised, (b) an indicator that the management rm is
a member of a venture capital organization, and indicators that the man-
agement rm prefers to invest across (c) a diverse range of industries, and
(d) a diverse range of regions.14 To test the validity of the instruments, I
report Hansen J tests for overidentication and Kleibergen-Paap tests for
underidentication. The general regression model is below:
14I deem a fund to prefer diverse industries/ regions if Thomson VentureXpert
states that the fund has no preference over regions/industries or prefers diverse re-
gions/industries. All instruments are from Thomson VenureXpert.
23Return = f (Num Inds;Num Geos; (1)
Intermediating Term(s);Controls)
Here, `Return' is the return variable, which is either the fund's IRR
or the risk-adjusted IRR (`Adj IRR'). `Controls' represents the control vari-
ables. `Intermediating Term(s)' represents the terms used to test the various
hypotheses. Section 3.4 details the terms.15
4 Results
This section contains the results. First, present a sample description. Sec-
ond, I present multivariate regression results. Third, I summarize and con-
solidate the results. Overall, I nd that diversication increases returns.
The most likely explanation is that diversication facilitates learning and
knowledge-sharing. I base this on (a) the result that diversication espe-
cially increases returns for seed funds, (b) the positive relation between
returns in the present fund and diversication in prior funds raised by the
fund's management rm, and (c) the nding no other explanation appears
to explain the relation between diversication and returns.
15In summary, they are: (Num Inds  Num Geos), (Num Inds  Num Geos)
2, Num
Inds/ Num People, Num Geos/Num People, Num Inds  Carry/Flat, Num Geos 
Carry/Flat, Num Port cos, Seed Fund.
244.1 Sample Description
Table 2 contains the sample description. Column 1 examines all PE-funds
in the sample. Columns 2-5 partition the sample into geographic diversi-
cation quartiles, where geographic diversication is the number of countries
in which the fund invests. Columns 6-9 partition the sample into indus-
try diversication quartiles, where industry diversication is the number of
industries in which the fund invests. All numbers are sample means.
The key univariate result is that IRRs and multiples increase with in-
dustry and geographic diversication. In both cases, funds whose industry,
or geographic, diversication is in the top quartile of the sample have higher
IRRs and multiples. Other interesting results are: First, industry diver-
sication and geographic diversication appear to increase together; that
is, funds that diversify across industries are more likely to diversify across
countries. Second, diversied rms appear to establish more connections,
emphasizing the importance of connections to operating across geographic
and industry environments. Third, diversied funds are more likely to invest
in `seed' investments. This is likely because seed investments are risky; and
thus, funds diversify in order to risk-manage.
4.2 Do diversied funds earn higher returns?
The results support the hypothesis that diversication across industry or
geography, but not both, increases returns. The main regression results are
in Table 3. The coecients on `Num Inds' and `Num Geos' are positive and
signicant in all model specications. This suggests that returns increase
25with diversication.16
The coecients on the interaction terms lend little support for Hypoth-
esis 7 . The coecient on (Num Inds  Num Geos)2 is negative and statis-
tically signicant; however, is small in magnitude and is not economically
signicant. Further, the statistical signicance appears to be due to a small
number of high-diversication funds. For example, the interaction term
(Num Inds  Num Geos)2 is insignicant in a sample that excludes funds
int he top 95% in terms of geographic diversication.
Figure 1 supports the results. It plots the tted values from Equation (1)
when there are no intermediating variables. That is, it shows the relation
between (a) IRRs and Num Inds, and (b) IRRs and Num Geos. It illustrates
the positive relationship between returns and both industry-diversication
and geographic-diversication. In particular, Panel (a) suggests a mono-
tonic relationship between industry diversication and IRRs. By contrast,
some prior studies document a non-linear relationship between IRRs and
diversication (see Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill, 1991; Palich, Cardinal, and
Miller, 2000; Qian, Khoury, Peng, and Qian, 2010). However, these studies
focus on corporate diversication rather than PE-fund diversication.
The control variables yield some interesting results. Large funds, as
proxied by `ln(Fund Size)', earn signicantly lower returns (at 1% signi-
cance in all models). This suggests diseconomies of scale in private equity.
PE-funds that invest in large companies earn higher returns on average (the
16Unreported regressions nd no evidence of a quadratic relationship between returns
and `Num Inds' or `Num Geos'. That is, the coecients on `Num Inds
2' and `Num Geos
2'
are insignicant. Unreported regressions also examine the natural log of the level of
industry and geographic diversication. These variables (`LnNumInds' and `LnNumGeos')
are positively and signicantly related to returns; the results are qualitatively similar to
those in the reported regressions.
26coecient on `ln(Investment Size)' is positive and signicant at 1% in all
models). This may reect skewness in the returns on small PE-investments.
PE-funds that are more connected earn higher returns (the coecient on
`Connected' is signicant at 5%). This quadrates with ndings that connec-
tions are important to forming syndicates, facilitating knowledge-spillovers,
and nancing deals (see Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007).
Funds that use their own money in the investment process earn lower
returns (the coecient on `Self Invests' being negative and signicant in most
models). This may be because funds self-invest if investors are unwilling to
invest in the fund. Thus unwillingness may derive from the belief that the
fund lacks protable investment opportunities.
The coecient on `Num Port Cos' is informative. The coecient on
`Num Port Cos' is positive and signicant. This implies that returns increase
with the number of companies in the fund's portfolio. A possible explanation
is that increasing the number of portfolio companies decreases the fund's
exposure to company-specic (idiosyncratic) risk. This might improve the
fund's risk/return relationship and ameliorate agency conicts of managerial
risk aversion.
Returns appear to decrease with the number of nancing rounds (`Num
Rounds'). Guler (2007) suggests that institutional/political pressures may
induce sub-optimal investments in subsequent investment rounds. The nega-
tive coecient on `Num Rounds' provides some support for this hypothesis,
indicating that returns decrease if the fund undertakes many investment
rounds.
27The coecients on `VCPE Sector Activity' and `Strong Equity Market'
are interesting. First, `VCPE Sector Activity' is negative and signicant
in most models. This quadrates with the `money chasing deals' hypothesis
that excess VCPE activity creates over-crowding and forces funds to invest in
companies that have diminishing returns-to-investment (Diller and Kaserer,
2009, see). Second, `Strong Equity Market' is insignicant and is usually
negative. The negative coecient quadrates with the `money chasing deals'
hypothesis. The insignicance suggests that the activity in the VCPE sector
is more relevant than the activity in the general market.
The overall nding is that diversication increases returns. The issue is
then whether diversication especially benets funds that invest in start-ups.
4.3 Does diversication especially assist PE-funds that make
seed investments?
The results support the seed-fund hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). The prediction
is that diversication is especially benecial to funds that invest in seed
companies. The regression results are in Panel A of Table 4. I suppress
control variables for brevity (the results for the control variables quadrate
with those in Table 3). The main ndings are (1) `Num Geos  Seed' is
postive and signicant in all models, and (2) `Num Inds  Seed Fund' is
positive and signicant in most models that do not control for `Num Geos
 Seed Fund'. This implies that geographic diversication is more useful
for seed funds than is industry diversication.
284.4 Returns and prior fund diversication
The results indicated that diversication in previous funds increases IRRs.
The learning hypothesis suggests that knowledge learned in prior funds can
lter through into subsequent funds raised by a management rm. Thus, if
(a) a management rm/ family raises multiple funds, and (b) there is some
overlap in personnel (or at least communication) between the funds, and (c)
diversication improves fund-managers' skills, then then diversication in
prior funds should increase IRRs in subsequent funds.
The results are in Panel B of Table 4. The key result is that the coecient
on `Num Inds (Prior Fund)' is positive and signicant in all models and `Num
Geos (Prior Fund)' is positive and signicant in most models. This suggests
that diversication in prior funds improves IRRs in subsequent funds. This
implies some support for the hypothesis that diversication improves returns
by facilitating learning and knowledge-sharing.
4.5 Diversication and limited attention
There is support for the limited attention hypothesis. Panel C of Table 4
contains the `limited attention' regressions. They test the hypothesis that
diversication reduces returns if it spreads sta across more industries or re-
gions. The coecients on the term `Num Inds/Num People' is negative and
signicant in all specications (Columns 1-6). The term `Num Geos/Num
People' is negative and signicant in regressions that do not control for `Num
Inds/Num People' (Columns 1,2,4,5). This implies that while both forms of
diversication can reduce value by spreading sta, industry diversication
29is more harmful in this respect.
4.6 Diversication and Fees
There is some support for the prediction that high levels of carry can create
risk aversion, which can motivate managers to diversify to reduce risk; and
thus, can reduce returns. The regression results are in Panel D of Table
4. They key nding is that both interactions term (`Carry/Flat  Num
Geos' and `Carry/Flat  Num Inds') are negative and signicant across
all models. This implies that performance-based compensation can reduce
returns by encouraging value destroying diversication (likely designed to
reduce the risk of failing to earn a performance bonus).
4.7 Endogeneity
Endogeneity does not drive the relation between diversication and IRRs.
The GMM results are in Table 5. The key that `Num Inds' and `Num Geos'
remain positive and signicant in both models (albeit at a lower level of
statistical signicance). Importantly, the Hansen J statistic suggests that I
cannot reject the null of over-identication and the Kleibergen-Paap statis-
tics suggest that I can reject the null of under-identication. This implies
that the instruments are valid.
304.8 Summary of results
The mosaic of results suggests that diversication creates value on average
and that this may be because it may facilitate knowledge-sharing. No in-
dividual result shows this. The key results are (1) diversication creates
value on average and there is limited evidence; (2) diversication is not per
se quadratically related to returns (except for some very high diversica-
tion funds); (3) diversication especially creates value for seed-funds, which
are the funds for whom diversication would convey the most knowledge-
sharing benets; (4) diversication in prior funds raised by a management
rm increases IRRs in subsequent funds, which implies learning from prior
funds' diversication-based experiences; (5) endogeneity does not appear to
drive the relation between returns and diversication; and (6) risk-reduction
does not drive the diversication/return relation. Overall, this suggests that
diversication can create value by encouraging knowledge-sharing and learn-
ing.
There is some support for the theory that risk-reduction increases IRRs;
however, this does not solely drive the relation between diversication and
returns. This is because (1) returns increase with the total number of compa-
nies in the funds' portfolio, implying that reducing the exposure to company-
specic risk increases returns; but, (2) industry/geographic diversication
still increases returns after controlling for the number of portfolio companies,
and industry/geographic diversication increase risk-adjusted IRRs.
Diversication can destroy value in some circumstances. It can destroy
value if it spreads sta over more industries or regions (i.e. lowers the sta-
to-industry or sta-to-region ratios). There is also some evidence that di-
31versication coupled with a high carry/at ratio reduces returns, suggesting
risk-reduction motivated diversication.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the benets and disbenets of diversication in PE-
funds. The corporate nance literature has focused on diversication as an
avenue of value destruction. The literature shows that diversied rms have
lower market values and make worse investment decisions (see for example
Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). However, diversication might improve
returns for corporations that make risky investments, lack agency conicts,
and benet from knowledge-spillovers. PE-funds are a key example of such
corporations.
The empirical results show that diversication benets PE-funds on av-
erage. The combined weight of evidence suggests that knowledge sharing
and learning drive the results. The key support is that: First, diversica-
tion especially increases returns for seed funds, which invest in high-tech
companies that particularly benet from knowledge-sharing and learning.
Second, returns are positively related to diversication in prior funds raised
by the fund's management rm. Thus, if there is some communication be-
tween funds, or there is some personnel overlap, then this implies knowledge
sharing and learning from prior diversication. Third, risk-reduction and
endogeneity do not appear to explain the relation between diversication
and returns.
The results also suggest that diversication can destroy value. diversi-
32cation destroys value if it spreads sta to thinly; that is, if it lowers the
ratio of sta-to-industries or sta-to regions. Diversication may also de-
stroy value if it couples with an emphasis on performance fees, suggesting
that agency conicts of managerial risk aversion drive such diversication.
Additional contributions are that increasing the number of portfolio com-
panies increases returns. This implies that reducing the overall exposure to
idiosyncratic risk benets fund returns. Further, I nd some support for the
theory in Guler (2007) that political and institutional pressure can induce
sub-optimal investments in subsequent investment rounds. Specically, re-
turns are negatively related to the number of investment rounds in which
the fund partakes.
These results make a key contribution to the private equity, venture cap-
ital, and management literature. The results show that PE-funds and VC-
funds can create investor-value by diversifying across industries and across
geographies. From a management perspective, the results show that di-
versication does not always destroy value, and can create value for some
rms. The results suggest that future literature can examine other types of
corporation that might benet from diversication.
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6 Tables
38Table 1: Empirical Predictions
Hypothesis Prediction Empirical Test/Implication
Hypothesis 1 Diversication increases returns. The diversication variables `Num Inds' and `Num
Geos' are positively related to returns.
Hypothesis 2 Diversication especially increases returns for seed
funds.
The interactions `Seed  Num Inds' and `Seed 
Num Geos' are positively related to returns.
Hypothesis 3 Diversication in the last fund that was raised
by the present fund's management rm should in-
crease returns in the present fund.
The variables `Num Inds (Prior Fund)' and `Num
Geos (Prior Fund)' are positively related to re-
turns.
Hypothesis 4 Diversication has no (or limited) impact on risk-
adjusted returns.
The variables `Num Inds' and `Num Geos' are
not signicantly related to the risk-adjusted re-
turns `Adj IRR', and do not inuence returns af-
ter controlling for general portfolio diversication
(as proxied by number of portfolio companies).
Hypothesis 5 Diversication reduces returns if it spreads the
sta across more industries.
The interaction term (Diversication/Number of
Sta) is negatively related to returns.
Hypothesis 6 Diversication reduces returns in funds that rely
more on performance bonuses than on manage-
ment fees (because diversication is merely to re-
duce fund-risk).
Returns are negatively related to the term
(Carry/Management)  Diversication.
Hypothesis 7 There is a quadratic type relationship between
returns and joint industry-geographic diversica-
tion.
(Industry Diversication  Geographic Diversi-
cation) increases returns whereas (Industry Di-
versication  Geographic Diversication)2 de-
creases returns.
3
9Hypothesis 8 The relation between diversication and returns
merely reects endogeneity.
Diversication does not inuence returns in GMM
regressions that instrument `Num Inds' or `Num
Geos'.
Hypothesis 9 Knowledge-sharing/learning at least partially ex-
plains the relation between diversication and
value-creation.
Diversication increases returns on average, this
especially holds for seed funds, is not due to mere
risk-reduction and is not due to endogeneity/ self-
selection.
4
0Table 2: Univariate Results
Table 2 contains the univariate statistics for the sample of 1505 PE-funds. Column 1 contains means for all the funds. Columns 2-5
focus on geographic diversication. Geographic diversication is the number of countries in which the fund invests. Columns 2, 3,




th quartile, respectively. Columns 6-9
focus on industry diversication. Industry diversication is the number of industries in hwich the fund invests. Columns 2, 3, 4, and
























IRR (%) 8.912 6.502 8.259 10.778 12.895 4.481 6.965 10.951 13.958
Adj IRR (%) 3.204 0.991 3.150 5.026 6.500 -1.159 2.233 5.062 7.311
Multiple 1.590 1.489 1.578 1.641 1.768 1.409 1.539 1.669 1.769
Num Inds 12.378 10.337 12.764 13.706 15.381 4.542 9.480 14.529 22.589
Num Geos 5.638 2.747 4.000 5.478 12.460 4.688 4.331 6.343 7.381
ln(Fund Size) 5.516 5.294 5.439 5.506 6.014 5.170 5.528 5.586 5.843
ln(Investment Size) 9.047 8.889 9.170 8.926 9.385 8.812 9.044 9.066 9.316
Seed Fund 0.071 0.065 0.037 0.075 0.099 0.046 0.088 0.072 0.081
Expertise 3.690 3.398 3.974 3.776 4.074 2.898 3.621 3.793 4.619
Connections 2.450 2.340 1.377 3.263 2.668 1.729 2.189 2.685 3.336
Self Invests 0.085 0.016 0.079 0.059 0.247 0.039 0.085 0.147 0.063
Rep Required 0.386 0.387 0.340 0.435 0.373 0.344 0.376 0.361 0.480
Prefers Control Shares 0.128 0.124 0.110 0.110 0.159 0.082 0.128 0.110 0.210
Solo Investor 0.179 0.169 0.099 0.286 0.167 0.094 0.157 0.245 0.225
Num Rounds 34.938 30.777 30.037 48.281 36.633 26.348 28.142 36.196 51.649
Num Port cos 15.609 14.404 12.275 19.422 17.172 11.276 12.649 17.838 21.432
Num People 9.065 6.967 7.778 9.956 13.444 6.366 7.668 10.005 12.770
Ave Flat 2.219 2.214 2.186 2.238 2.232 2.256 2.231 2.212 2.166
4
1Ave Carry 20.500 20.176 20.401 20.323 21.345 20.413 20.530 20.414 20.683
Carry/Flat 9.445 9.240 9.532 9.234 9.970 9.229 9.393 9.409 9.820
Num Inds/ Num people 1.787 1.839 2.115 1.806 1.489 1.036 1.609 1.970 2.682
Num Geos/ Num People 0.791 0.584 0.676 0.851 1.237 0.985 0.702 0.755 0.698
VCPE Sector Activity 0.168 0.165 0.171 0.177 0.167 0.142 0.153 0.189 0.191
Strong Equity Market 0.482 0.475 0.524 0.486 0.470 0.459 0.490 0.484 0.497
4
2Table 3: Diversication and returns
Table 3 contains the regression results. The dependent variable for Columns 1-3 is the fund's IRR. The dependent variable for




 denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Dependent Variable IRR IRR IRR Adj IRR Adj IRR Adj IRR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Num Inds 0.294 0.541 0.205 0.260 0.489 0.15
[0.004] [0.000] [0.212] [0.006] [0.000] [0.319]
Num Geos 0.029 0.737 0.275 0.048 0.704 0.24
[0.853] [0.010] [0.340] [0.734] [0.004] [0.320]
Num Rounds -0.072 -0.069 -0.067 -0.056 -0.053 -0.051
[0.020] [0.027] [0.031] [0.051] [0.065] [0.076]
Num Port Cos 0.182 0.179 0.168 0.198 0.196 0.185
[0.041] [0.044] [0.057] [0.015] [0.016] [0.022]
Num People 0.384 0.462 0.461 0.348 0.421 0.419
[0.005] [0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.001] [0.001]
Num Inds  Num Geos -0.045 0.037 -0.042 0.041
[0.001] [0.221] [0.001] [0.123]
(Num Inds  Num Geos)2 -0.001 -0.001
[0.002] [0.001]
ln(Fund Size) -2.535 -2.727 -2.843 -2.735 -2.914 -3.028
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ln(Investment Size) 2.090 2.114 2.303 1.840 1.862 2.051
[0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.004] [0.003] [0.001]
Seed Fund 8.168 8.032 7.333 8.823 8.701 8.002
[0.017] [0.018] [0.028] [0.005] [0.005] [0.009]
Expertise 0.502 0.48 0.458 0.501 0.480 0.458
[0.088] [0.102] [0.119] [0.063] [0.074] [0.088]
4
3Connections 0.194 0.181 0.177 0.168 0.156 0.152
[0.039] [0.056] [0.062] [0.041] [0.060] [0.068]
Self Invests -3.390 -3.884 -4.924 -3.256 -3.714 -4.765
[0.067] [0.036] [0.012] [0.067] [0.036] [0.011]
Rep Required 0.763 0.295 0.776 0.633 0.2 0.683
[0.574] [0.829] [0.561] [0.618] [0.876] [0.585]
Prefer Control Shares -1.418 -0.733 -0.579 -2.35 -1.718 -1.567
[0.380] [0.651] [0.720] [0.122] [0.258] [0.301]
Ave Mgt Fee -3.337 -3.597 -3.191 -1.463 -1.706 -1.291
[0.034] [0.020] [0.037] [0.342] [0.261] [0.386]
Ave Carry 0.756 0.680 0.677 0.37 0.3 0.297
[0.014] [0.026] [0.025] [0.188] [0.286] [0.285]
Solo Investor 0.991 1.093 1.759 0.794 0.89 1.566
[0.512] [0.466] [0.245] [0.569] [0.520] [0.261]
VCPE Sector Activity -11.170 -10.793 -10.917 -8.148 -7.829 -7.901
[0.040] [0.048] [0.045] [0.118] [0.134] [0.130]
Strong Equity Market 6.174 6.529 7.22 -9.59 -9.469 -8.479
[0.590] [0.580] [0.531] [0.333] [0.358] [0.392]
Constant -11.224 -13.287 -15.022 -9.014 -10.746 -13.236
[0.399] [0.326] [0.254] [0.480] [0.408] [0.296]
Observations 1,505 1,505 1,505 1,501 1,501 1,501
R-squared 28.50% 28.90% 29.30% 10.40% 10.80% 11.40%
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Figure 1 plots `predicted IRRs' by industry and geographic diversication. For Panel
(a), the `predicted IRRs' are the tted values from an estimation of Equation (1) that
only includes `NumInds' and the controls; for Panel (b), the `predicted IRRs' are the
tted values from an estimation Equation (1) that only includes `NumGeos' and the
controls. The vertical axis is the fund's percentage IRR. The horizontal axis in Panel (a)
is the number of industries in which the fund invests; and for Panel (b) is the number of
geographic regions in which the fund invests.
45Table 4: Seed Funds, Number of People, and Fees
Dependent Variable IRR IRR IRR Adj IRR Adj IRR Adj IRR
Panel A: Seed Funds
NumInds 0.193 0.268 0.207 0.183 0.231 0.198
[0.044] [0.007] [0.030] [0.040] [0.013] [0.026]
NumGeos 0.017 -0.087 -0.068 0.039 -0.068 -0.058
[0.916] [0.570] [0.658] [0.785] [0.623] [0.677]
Num People 0.402 0.413 0.418 0.362 0.377 0.380
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Seed  Num Inds 1.154 0.762 0.874 0.414
[0.037] [0.200] [0.077] [0.435]
Seed  Num Geos 2.687 2.053 2.754 2.403
[0.010] [0.071] [0.004] [0.022]
Constant -9.645 -12.544 -11.191 -7.77 -10.114 -9.385
[0.468] [0.342] [0.396] [0.549] [0.431] [0.467]
Observations 1,505 1,505 1,505 1,501 1,501 1,501
R-squared 0.291 0.293 0.295 10.90% 11.50% 11.60%
Panel B: Prior Fund Diversication
Num Inds (Prior Fund) 0.308 0.308 0.338 0.338
[0.053] [0.053] [0.013] [0.013]
Num Inds (Prior Fund) 0.394 0.462 0.394 0.202 0.277 0.202
[0.051] [0.020] [0.051] [0.214] [0.088] [0.214]
Constant -0.633 4.47 -0.633 1.485 7.076 1.485
[0.953] [0.660] [0.953] [0.874] [0.421] [0.874]
Observations 753 753 753 753 753 753
4
6R-squared 13.90% 13.30% 13.90% 10.10% 9.20% 10.10%
Panel C: Number of People
NumInds 0.512 0.299 0.500 0.476 0.264 0.472
[0.000] [0.003] [0.001] [0.000] [0.005] [0.000]
NumGeos 0.065 0.238 0.098 0.084 0.242 0.097
[0.671] [0.221] [0.640] [0.546] [0.181] [0.617]
Num People 0.108 0.219 0.097 0.074 0.195 0.07
[0.514] [0.170] [0.572] [0.632] [0.192] [0.664]
Num Inds/ Num People -1.319 -1.243 -1.310 -1.279
[0.003] [0.023] [0.003] [0.017]
Num Geos /Num People -1.784 -0.297 -1.650 -0.118
[0.052] [0.798] [0.067] [0.916]
LnFundSize -2.659 -2.521 -2.649 -2.858 -2.721 -2.854
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Constant -10.428 -8.813 -10.072 -8.33 -6.964 -8.199
[0.433] [0.508] [0.451] [0.511] [0.587] [0.520]
Observations 1,505 1,505 1,505 1,501 1,501 1,501
R-squared 28.80% 28.60% 28.80% 10.80% 10.50% 10.80%
Panel D: Fees
NumInds 1.164 0.284 1.038 0.800 0.255 0.692
[0.000] [0.006] [0.001] [0.006] [0.007] [0.021]
NumGeos 0.047 0.843 0.615 0.057 0.676 0.544
[0.764] [0.030] [0.100] [0.691] [0.056] [0.127]
Num People 0.403 0.397 0.404 0.357 0.354 0.358
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Carry/Flat -0.93 -0.797 0.39 0.414 0.856 1.547
[0.832] [0.856] [0.930] [0.919] [0.834] [0.706]
4
7Carry/Flat  Num Inds -0.092 -0.079 -0.057 -0.046
[0.001] [0.004] [0.029] [0.087]
Carry/Flat  Num Geos -0.081 -0.057 -0.063 -0.049
[0.012] [0.062] [0.031] [0.101]
Constant -10.003 -9.602 -20.583 -14.71 -17.472 -23.833
[0.755] [0.765] [0.525] [0.626] [0.561] [0.433]
Observations 1,505 1,505 1,505 1,501 1,501 1,501
R-squared 28.80% 28.70% 28.90% 10.50% 10.50% 10.60%
4
8Table 5: GMM Regressions
Table 5 contains GMM-based regression results. The dependent variable is the
fund's IRR. Brackets contain p-values based upon robust standard errors. All
models include vintage dummies. The instrumented variables are `Num Inds' and
`Num Geos'. The four instruments are: the number of funds that the management
rm had previously raised, an indicator that the management rm is a member of
a venture capital association, and indicators that the management rm prefers to
invest across a diverse range of industries or regions. Superscripts , , and 
denote signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.






Num Rounds -0.082 -0.071
[0.011] [0.027]
Num Port Cos 0.099 0.234
[0.347] [0.010]
Num People -0.226 -0.174
[0.581] [0.692]
ln(Fund Size) -2.359 -2.545
[0.005] [0.004]
ln(Investment Size) 2.504 2.301
[0.001] [0.002]






Self Invests -6.247 -13.299
[0.012] [0.034]
Rep Required 0.567 0.855
[0.692] [0.533]
Prefer Control Shares -2.04 -1.886
[0.227] [0.270]
Ave Mgt Fee -2.192 -4.203
[0.260] [0.020]
Ave Carry 1.024 -0.194
[0.005] [0.754]
Solo Investor -0.57 1.53
[0.711] [0.341]
VCPE Sector Activity -21.167 -6.213
[0.014] [0.268]
Strong Equity Market -2.61 -3.944
[0.321] [0.116]
49Constant -46.806 -9.247
[0.001] [0.407]
Observations 1,505 1,505
R-squared 18.50% 21.90%
Hansen J overidentica-
tion statistic
5.005 5.446
[0.172] [0.142]
Kleibergen-Paap LM un-
deridentication statistic
17.86 25.62
[0.001] [0.000]
Kleibergen-Paap Wald
underidentication statis-
tic
18.97 28.82
[0.001] [0.000]
50